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I. INTRODUCTION
Golfer John Daly had an exceptional year in 2001.' Since 1995, when
he won the British Open, Daly had not won a tournament.2 In 1999, "Daly's
career was at a low point, when he struggled on the course, returned to drink-
ing and blew a lucrative endorsement deal with Callaway that prohibited him
from drinking and gambling." 3 By the end of 2000, free from drinking for a
few months, Daly signed a three-year endorsement with Hippo Golf Compa-
ny (Hippo)4 and another with 84 Lumber Company. In 2001, Daly won the
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University. J.D.,
Duke University; M.S.L.S., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B., Hamilton
College. Portions of this article were prepared for a panel discussion presented by the NSU
Sports and Entertainment Law Society.
1. See Gerry Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Feb. 17, 2004, at B7 [hereinafter Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic].
2. Jim Gordon, The Anti-Fan: John Daly Is Only Fooling John Daly, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, July 17, 2000, at B2.
3. Clifton Brown, Daly's Swing and His Life Straighten Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001,
at D2.
Daly's drinking has cost him . . . his endorsement with Wilson Golf. It cost him a $3 million
deal with Callaway Golf, more money than his combined earnings on the PGA Tour. It proba-
bly didn't help any of his three marriages, the last of which ended in divorce in 1997 after Daly
trashed a hotel room and wound up in a hospital, unsure where he had been or how he had got-
ten there.
Gordon, supra note 2.
4. John Daly Enters., L.L.C. v. Hippo Golf Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1348 (S.D. Fla.
2009). The agreement began on January 1, 2001. Id. A 2002 agreement licensed "Daly's
name, likeness, and marks to [Hippo] for use in the sale of golf clubs and related equipment."
Id.
5. Gerry Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps Fulfill Hardy's Wish For Top-Notch Field,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2004, at Cl [hereinafter Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps
Fulfill Hardy's Wish].
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BMW International Open, a tournament on the European Tour.6 Daly
seemed on his way back from a nightmarish spiral of alcohol and gambling.'
Yet, in 2003, another reverse found Daly "carted off the course during the
second round of the 84 Lumber Classic because of what was termed dehy-
dration."
Joe Hardy, founder and owner of 84 Lumber Company, kept faith in
Daly and saw him through the hard times of 2003, finally rejoicing when
Daly won the 2004 Buick Invitational Tournament-his first win on the PGA
tour in nine years. 9 In contrast, Hippo and Daly did not renew their con-
tract.'o By September of 2004, Daly's second recovery had netted him a
sponsorship with Dunlop and saw him ranked nineteenth on the tour's money
list."
Yet Daly's dramatic turn of fortune had one negative result: Hippo con-
tinued using Daly's name and picture on its website and products well after
the end of its contracts with Daly, without Daly's permission. 2 Needless to
say, with Daly promoting Dunlop's clubs, the continuing use of his name by
Hippo created a conflict uncomfortable at best.' 3 To make matters worse,
Daly received nothing by way of royalties from Hippo.14 Daly sued Hippo,
seeking damages on several counts, including a violation of Florida Statutes
section 540.08,1 alleging that Hippo had used his name and likeness for ad-
vertising and commercial purposes. 6
6. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
7. See Brown, supra note 3. Fellow golf pro, Hal Sutton, said of Daly: "[W]hen you're
on the way down, you don't know where rock bottom is until you get there. It takes a lot
inside to climb back up. John's a good guy." Id.
8. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
9. Id.; Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps Fulfill Hardy's Wish, supra note 5.
10. John Daly Enters., L.L.C. v. Hippo Golf Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (S.D. Fla.
2009). "The contract period ended on December 31, 2003, but because [Hippo] had inventory
remaining, [Daly] gave it until March 31, 2004, to divest itself of all John Daly-branded mer-
chandise in its possession." Id.
11. Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1; Dulac, Daly's Drive Helps
Fulfill Hardy's Wish, supra note 5.
12. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49.
13. See Dulac, Daly's Buick Win Boosts 84 Classic, supra note 1.
14. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1349, 1352.
15. FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2004).
Unauthorized publication of name or likeness:
(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or
for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of
any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use given by:
(a) Such person; or
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person to license the
commercial use of her or his name or likeness; or
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In 1967, the Florida Legislature passed an expansive actl 7 dealing with
the branch of privacy known as "commercial appropriation."' The statute
prohibited non-consensual publication of a natural person's "name, portrait,
photograph or other likeness" "for purposes of trade or for any commercial
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to license
the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so au-
thorized, then by any one from among a class composed of her or his surviving spouse and
surviving children.
(2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the person whose name,
portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any person, firm, or corporation authorized
by such person in writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or, if
the person whose likeness is used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right
to give such consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unautho-
rized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover damages for any loss or
injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable
royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to:
(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any
newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication
as part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public in-
terest and where such name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes;
(b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the resale
or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other articles of merchandise
or property where such person has consented to the use of her or his name, portrait, photo-
graph, or likeness on or in connection with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or
(c) Any photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person is not
named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such photograph.
(4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publication, printing, dis-
play, or other public use of the name or likeness of a person occurring after the expiration of
40 years from and after the death of such person.
(5) As used in this section, a person's "surviving spouse" is the person's surviving spouse un-
der the law of her or his domicile at the time of her or his death, whether or not the spouse has
later remarried; and a person's "children" are her or his immediate offspring and any children
legally adopted by the person. Any consent provided for in subsection (1) shall be given on
behalf of a minor by the guardian of her or his person or by either parent.
(6) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in limitation of the
remedies and rights of any person under the common law against the invasion of her or his pri-
vacy.
Id. Compare FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2004), with FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
16. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49. John Daly Enterprises, LLC,
also joined Daly as a plaintiff in the suit for claims other than those under Florida Statutes
section 540.08. See id. at 1348. This article will refer only to Daly himself, as the statute only
protects natural persons, and the corporation is not a natural person. Id. at 1351 (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011)).
17. See generally Act effective July 1, 1967, ch. 67-57, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 135 (codi-
fied as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08-.10 (1967)).
18. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 20, at
851 (5th ed. 1984).
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or advertising purpose."' 9 A later amendment in 1997 did nothing more than
change certain language to make the statute gender-neutral.20 A second
amendment ten years later added the present subsection three relating to the
military.21 The title of the statute, as originally passed, indicates rather clear-
ly the legislature's intent to protect natural persons from unwanted commer-
cial exposure: "An act . . . prohibiting the unauthorized publication of ...
name . . . or other likeness; authorizing action to enjoin such unauthorized
publication; authorizing action to recover damages; [and] providing limited
exemptions from such liability . . . .22
Daly moved for summary judgment arguing that Hippo's continued use
of his name and likeness beyond the contract date and agreed extension vi-
olated the statute.23  Hippo countered by arguing that its website postings
constituted "fair use."24 Hippo's website listed several golfers, among them
Daly, who had previously endorsed Hippo products. 25 However, it posted a
picture of Daly accompanied by the following text:
The twice major winner and golfing superstar, John Daly, will
continue to be synonomous [sic] with Hippo. Renowned as the
longest hitter in the professional game, Daly truly had the power of
Hippo behind his game, working closely with the Hippo design
teams over the years to produce some of the most technologically
advanced woods to hit the golf market.26
19. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (1967); John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
The statute also provided that the prohibition transcended the death of the person and licen-
sees or the person's immediate family could assert the rights created by the statute for forty
years subsequent to the person's death. FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08(1)(c), .08(4). It provided for
causes of action both legal and equitable, including punitive damages. Id. § 540.08(2). It also
provided for situations in which the statute would not apply, including newsworthy publica-
tions and publications "in connection with the initial sale or distribution" of the otherwise
offending use. Id. § 540.08(3)(b). Significantly, the statute also provided that it did not cur-
tail the common law right of privacy. Id. § 540.08(6).
20. Act effective May 24, 1997, ch. 97-103, §§ 751-52, 1997 Fla. Laws 1756, 2120-21
(amending FLA. STAT. §§ 540.08-.09 (1967)).
21. Act effective July 1, 2007, ch. 2007-164, § 2, 2007 Fla. Laws 1528, 1528 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 540.08(3) (1997)); see also FLA. STAT. § 540.08(3) (2011).
22. Act effective July 1, 1967, ch. 67-57, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 135.
23. John Daly Enters., LL.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
24. Id. The statute does not include "fair use" in its list of exempted uses. FLA. STAT. §
540.08(4). However, as the court found Hippo's act to fall well outside of any possible "fair
use" at common law, it did not discuss whether "fair use" is indeed a common law defense
that might apply to causes of action under the statute. See John Daly Enters., L.LC., 646 F.
Supp. 2d at 1351.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court rejected Hippo's argument, finding that claiming Daly "will
continue to be synonymous with [Hippo] directly promotes [Hippo's] prod-
ucts." 27 Thus, the court effectively concluded that the nonconsensual use to
promote products constituted a "'use for purposes of trade or for any com-
mercial or advertising purpose,"' and as Hippo had violated the statute, the
court granted partial summary judgment to Daly on the issue of liability. 28
John Daly's case, only one of several discussing the meaning of "any
commercial or advertising purpose," involved a blatant attempt to capitalize
on the fame of a well-known and well-liked public person.29 The court had
no trouble in rejecting out of hand Hippo's claim that it simply stated the
truth-that Daly formerly endorsed its products.30 Other cases involving
Florida substantive law, however, found it more difficult to interpret the lan-
guage of the statute. 3' This article discusses them and determines when the
statute will sustain a cause of action and when courts will reject the statutory
action.
The cases seem to fall into clearly defined categories whose boundaries
follow closely those governing defamation cases. The first, like that involv-
ing Daly, deals with people whose identity commands the interest of con-
sumers.32 These individuals all satisfy the public figure analysis found in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. ButtS3 3-whether general purpose or limited pur-
pose, all have become persons of interest. 34 The second category of cases
deals with everyday people who found themselves embroiled in "public is-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1351, 1354 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1)). As the court found questions
remained regarding the extent of Daly's damages, it did not grant Daly's motion for full sum-
mary judgment. John Daly Enters., L.L. C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. The court also granted
partial summary judgment finding liability on Daly's claims of trademark infringement and
breach of contract. Id. at 1348.
29. See id. at 1351. "Even in his darkest days, John Daly was always loved by the galle-
ries." Brown, supra note 3.
30. John Daly Enters., L.L.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
31. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32. Id. at 154-55.
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
34. See id. at 155. One may attain the status of general purpose public figure:
[B]y position alone and [one may attain the status of limited purpose public figure] by his pur-
poseful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the "vortex" of an important
public controversy, but both [must command] sufficient continuing public interest and [have]
sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able "to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies" of the defamatory statements.
Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
2011] I 19
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sues", as the concept first appeared in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 5 The
final category involves neither persons nor concerns of any particular public
interest, much like the litigants in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.36 In all cases which resulted in victories for the plaintiffs, the
defendants involved the plaintiffs' names and/or pictures in commercial ven-
tures-whether directly or in a promotional context. The commercial exploi-
tation for profit present in these cases makes the comparison with defamation
cases particularly relevant, for these publications, like those in Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., are "solely motivated by the desire for profit, which, we have
noted, is a force less likely to be deterred than others."37
II. PUBLIC FIGURES
Other than John Daly, the most recognizable plaintiff in cases interpret-
ing Florida Statutes section 540.08 was Cecil Fielder, the Hall of Fame first
baseman for the Detroit Tigers. 38 Fielder had sued a former interior designer
for using Fielder's name in advertising materials without his consent.39 Al-
though the designer, Robert Weinstein, agreed to an injunction prohibiting
him from using Fielder's name, an article in Florida Design regarding
Weinstein mentioned that he had worked for the Fielder family.40 Further,
Weinstein had brochures printed containing the Florida Design article, but
never distributed them. 41 At trial, the judge refused Weinstein's motion for a
directed verdict and the jury found for Fielder.42 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal considered whether, given Weinstein's admission that he violated
the provisions of section 540.08, the jury should have been allowed to con-
sider the article and the brochures in determining the extent of the violation.43
Without question, Florida Design as a quarterly trade magazine quali-
fied as a media outlet, and the evidence showed that the article was classified
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Thus we consider this case against the background of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unplea-
santly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
36. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
37. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762.
38. See Cecil Fielder, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.cOM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/
players/f/fieldce0l.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
39. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
40. Id. at 993, 998.
41. Id. at 996, 999.
42. Id. at 993, 999.
43. See id. at 993, 998-99. Weinstein did not dispute that other publications of his vi-
olated the statute. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 996.
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as an editorial and written by a Florida Design reporter." On the other hand,
Weinstein was given a proof of the article to approve, and "use of Fielder's
name in the article came about exclusively through information supplied by
Weinstein, not from any independent research by the article's author."45
Thus, the court agreed that the trial court properly placed before the jury the
question of whether the article represented inappropriate advertising under
section 540.08 and thus fell outside the exception of section 540.08(3)(a).4 6
As to the brochures, the court found that even though not a single one had
ever left Weinstein's hands, since they were patently advertising and since
the statute prohibits printing a person's name in violation of the statute, the
trial court properly allowed "the jury to consider them in determining any
damage award."4 7
Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder"* represents two truly unusual
results. At first, the case recognizes that the finder of fact may determine
that an article placed in a legitimate media outlet nonetheless constitutes ad-
vertising purposes even where the article is of public concern.4 Second,
merely printing material to be used in advertising will violate section 540.08
even when the material has not reached a single person.50 Taken together,
these results demonstrate the commitment of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal to interpret the statute as protecting individuals from deliberate at-
tempts to improperly cloak advertising material in the garb of newsworthi-
ness. 51
Courts from other jurisdictions have had occasion to interpret Florida
law.52  A federal district court in Ohio granted a preliminary injunction
44. See id. at 998.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 999. At the time of the case, the language exempting a "bona fide news report
or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or like-
ness is not used for advertising purposes" was found in subsection (3)(a). FLA. STAT. §
540.08(3)(a) (2004) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a) (2011)).
47. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 999.
48. 884 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
49. See id. at 998-99. The New York Court of Appeals has indicated in dicta that given
proper proof, a plaintiff may have a jury consider whether an article nevertheless constitutes
advertising. Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 586 (N.Y. 1984). Al-
though the Florida and New York statutes are very similar ("[t]he Florida statute relied upon is
quite similar to Sections 50 and 51 of the New York [civil rights law]." Messenger ex rel.
Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, 994 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated,
208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000)) as the New York statute is in derogation of common law, it is
strictly construed. See, e.g., Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584-85.
50. See Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 999.
51. See id. at 998-99.
52. See, e.g., Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
2011] 121
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against further publication in the case of a well-known television reporter
who was filmed engaging in a wet t-shirt competition in Florida.53 Unbek-
nownst to her, the competition was filmed and her performance found its
way to the Internet and into two versions of a video.54 The defendants pro-
moted both the websites and the video by "emphasizing the appearance of
Catherine Bosley or the 'naked anchor woman.'" 5 5  Bosley's picture and
name appeared on the video's cover as well as on the website which sold her
performance to its subscribers. 6 The court had little trouble in finding the
defendants liable under the Florida statute, which the court found prohibited
''using a person's name or likeness to directly promote a product or service.
Indeed, Defendants are using the images of Catherine Bosley to directly
promote the sale of videos and memberships." 57
The court continued to find that the promotional material did not consti-
tute "expressive works, as they do not contain any creative components or
transformative elements."58 The court also discussed the question of Bos-
ley's consent to the filming of the contest, noting that the defendants intro-
duced evidence which might have cast doubt on her protestation that she had
no idea cameras were present and rolling.59 However, as the statute requires
"express written or oral consent,"' and the defendants introduced no evi-
dence of Bosley having expressly given consent, their argument failed.61
Sony Music Entertainment Incorporated (Sony) issued eight CD record-
ings of the music of Harold Melvin and the Blue Notes.62 The outside covers
of three of the CDs displayed the picture of Jeremiah Cummings.6 3 Sony had
not received Cummings' consent for the use of his picture, and when Cum-
mings sued Sony, he moved for judgment on the pleadings.64 Applying Flor-
ida law, the court held "by placing Plaintiffs likeness on merchandise mar-
53. Id. at 917, 936.
54. Id. at 917.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 922.
57. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 922. Compare id., with infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
59. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 931. Signs abounded in the areas of the contest, and some
pictures showed Bosley scant feet from the camera looking directly at it. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011).
61. Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
62. Cummings v. Sony Music, No. OlCiv.4375RCCKNF, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
63. Id. at *3. The court held that the cause of action as it related to five of the CDs was
time barred. Id. at *1. Cummings was the lead tenor of the Blue Notes and today is a well-
known evangelical preacher. Jeremiah Cummings, For His Glory International, RIGHT BRAIN
MEDIA, http://wicctv.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
64. Cummings, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1.
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keted by Defendant, without Plaintiffs permission, Defendant has publicly
used Plaintiffs photograph for commercial purposes."
Thus, John Daly Enterprises, LLC v. Hippo Golf Co.,66 Bosley v. Wild-
wett.com, 67 and Cummings v. Sony MusiC68 establish that, under the Florida
Statutes, one cannot seek to capitalize on the associative value of a well-
known personality in marketing a product. Unquestionably, consumers will
purchase products based on celebrity endorsements even where the endorser
may have no apparent relation to the product itself.70 Equally obvious, con-
sumers rush to buy and view pictures and videos of the famous.71 Clearly,
section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes in part exists to protect "celebrities and
other public figures [who] have come to rely on the right of publicity to pro-
tect them from the intrusion of others."72 It should come as no surprise that
the same protection extends to those who have not achieved substantial pub-
65. Id. at *3.
66. 646 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
67. 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
68. No. 0lCiv.4375RCCKNF, 2003 WL 22271189, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003).
69. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 997-98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); see FLA. STAT. § 540.08; see John Daly Enters., LL.C., 646 F. Supp. 2d at 1351;
see also Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920; Cummings, 2003 WL 22271189, at *3. "[T]he right
of publicity is a proprietary right based on the identity of a character or defining trait that
becomes associated with a person when he gains notoriety or fame." McFarland ex rel. Estate
of McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying New Jersey law). Another
suit involving a well-known personality and the Florida Statutes was brought by Anna Kour-
nikova, the tennis player, against the publisher of Penthouse Magazine for printing a photo-
graph falsely purporting to represent her sunbathing in the nude. Kournikova v. Gen. Media
Commc'ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF (AJWx), 2002 WL 31628027, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
9, 2002). Her first amended complaint included a count alleging violation of the Florida
Statutes. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was denied. Id. at *10.
However, a later complaint appeared to have abandoned the Florida claim, and the case pro-
ceeded under a theory involving the Lanham Act. Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc'ns,
Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114-15 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
70. Ramson v. Layne, 668 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (N.D. 1Il. 1987). For example, in Ram-
son, an investor sued movie actors Lloyd Bridges and George Hamilton, who had endorsed
the purchase of a mortgage note which she had never received. Id. at 1163.
71. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800-01 (Cal.
2001). For instance, well after the demise of the members of the popular film trio, the Three
Stooges, litigation proliferated seeking to prohibit the use of their images on various commer-
cial products. Id.
72. Fla. S. Comm. on Commerce, CS for SB 116 (2007) Staff Analysis 2 (Mar. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/datal
session/2007/senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s0 116.cm.pdf (discussing an amendment to section
540.08 of the Florida Statutes to include members of the armed forces in its protection).
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lic recognition, but have garnered sufficient notice in their fields to make
their name or image influential in marketing products to others.73
Dr. Jey Jeyapalan was the proverbial big fish in a very small pond.74 A
renowned expert in a very narrow field of engineering, he received offers to
consult and speak around the globe. In 1991, he agreed to work with a
Florida engineering firm on designing a specific project for a pipeline system
in Florida. 6 When the firm used his name without his consent as part of a
proposal for a different project in Broward County, he sued claiming viola-
tion of section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes and sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability.77 The court granted his motion, finding
that, "'commercial trade or advertising purposes' is precisely the type of
action in which [the defendant] has engaged here."78 Thus, the court adopted
an expansive, albeit logical, interpretation of "advertising purposes" to in-
clude bidding to secure a contract.79 Dr. Jeyapalan's name would have en-
hanced the ability of the firm to win the bid, and so the defendant had sought
80to capitalize on his professional persona without his consent.
Professional models effectively thrust themselves into the limelight
simply by performing their jobs."' This does not make them general purpose
public figures, nor does it accord them any particular degree of fame.8 2
Nothing points this out more forcefully than the case of Ting Ji, who sued
Bose Corporation pursuant to the Florida statute. In a preliminary matter,
the trial court found:
Ji has provided no direct evidence that she enjoys any fame what-
soever. In support of her claim, she refers to her full-time work as
a professional model and to the fact that she has appeared on mul-
tiple occasions in other advertisements for high-end electronic
products. Bose counters that her income from modeling ($19,500
73. See Am. Ventures, Inc. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc., No. C92-1817Z,
1993 WL 468643, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 1993).
74. See id. at *4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *1.
77. See id. at *2-3.
78. Am. Ventures, Inc., 1993 WL 468643, at *8.
79. See id.
80. See id. at *6.
81. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). The Supreme Court has
defined a limited purpose public figure as one who has "thrust himself into the 'vortex' of the
controversy." Id. at 146.
82. See Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji 1), 538 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (D. Mass. 2008),
aff'd, 626 F. 3d 116 (1st Cir. 2010).
83. See id. at 349, 353.
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per year) and the dearth of news accounts mentioning her name
demonstrate that she has no meaningful public identity.8
The plaintiff later won a jury verdict in an action brought pursuant to
the Florida statute, but only for a fraction of the damages she had claimed."
Evidently the jury agreed that she had not achieved any particular degree of
fame.86 On the other hand, her lack of substantial name or face recognition
did not bar her action under the statute.87 Bose had used her picture beyond
the scope of their contract in displaying it on the packaging of one of their
products. In response to an interrogatory verdict, the jury found that Bose
had violated her rights under the statute.89
In another case involving a model claiming rights under the statute, An-
heuser Busch (A-B) continued to use her picture subsequent to the expiration
of their agreement. 90 Although the model, Jennifer Miller, had signed a re-
lease until January of 2003, the defendant continued to use her picture after
that date.9' "Regardless of any prior consent Miller granted A-B, therefore,
the evidence in the record indicates that A-B did not have Miller's authoriza-
tion to use her likeness from and after January 2003, as required by [section
540.08 of the Florida Statutes.]" 9 2 Both Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji I)93
and Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,94 involve plaintiffs whose stock in trade
is their picture, and it should come as no surprise that they, like the famous,
require the protection of the statute.95 Indeed, the use of a model's likeness
will almost inevitably involve advertising purposes.
Sports figures, actors, politicians, and others whose personae can serve
as a trigger to convince others to purchase a seller's product are particularly
susceptible to commercial exploitation.9 6 Similarly, advertisers will find
models easy prey for commercial abuse, for the very purpose of a model's
career is promotion of the products of another. As a result, the common law
84. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
85. Ting Ji v. Bose Corp. (Ting Ji II), 626 F.3d 16, 120-21 (1st Cir. 2010).
86. See id. at 120.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id. at 120-21.
90. Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 F. App'x 547, 549-50 (11th Cir.2009) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2387 (2010).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 550; See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
93. 538 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd, 626 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2010).
94. 348 F. App'x 547 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2387 (2010).
95. See Miller, 348 F. App'x, at 550-51; Ting Ji ll, 626 F.3d at 119-21; Ting Ji , 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 349-51.
96. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
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tort cause of action for invasion of publicity developed to protect the com-
mercial value of a person's persona, and the Florida Legislature enacted sec-
tion 540.08 to clarify and enhance judge-made law. 97 That said, the legisla-
ture also intended the statute to protect those, whose names and images did
not command the attention of the buying public." This article now focuses
on those "private persons."
III. "PRIVATE PERSONS" IN MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
While celebrities seek to prevent others from capitalizing on the reputa-
tions they have built over the years, those who have established no such as-
sociative monetary values still have a vital concern to protect: the right to
privacy." The Florida Legislature unquestionably intended to protect this
right, as evidenced by the Senate Staff Analysis of the 2007 amendment to
section 540.08: "The right to privacy is a long cherished American tradition.
The Florida Constitution addresses the right of every natural person to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life."'"
On the other hand, just as with the ability to sue for defamation, the
right to privacy must yield to the freedom of the press to report on matters of
public concern.'o' Accordingly, the Florida Legislature incorporated into the
publicity statute an exception for:
The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of
any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or
telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any bona
fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate
97. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1997). For example, at common law, courts frequently
struggled with the question of whether the right of publicity will descend to a person's heirs.
See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Subsection 1(c) of the
statute clearly establishes the right can devolve on the heirs and assigns of a decedent. FLA.
STAT. § 540.08(1)(c).
98. Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra note 72, at 2. "Florida Statutes explicitly prohibit
the last form of an invasion of privacy-appropriation-and provide a civil remedy for a
violation of the statute." Id.
99. See id.
100. Fla. S. Comm. on Commerce, CS for SB 116 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Feb. 8, 2007)
[hereinafter Feb. 8, 2007 Staff Analysis], available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/
datalsession/2007/senatelbills/analysis/pdfl2007s0116.ms.pdf (discussing an amendment to
section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes to include members of the armed forces in its protec-
tion).
101. Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra note 72, at 2-3.
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public interest and where such name or likeness is not used for ad-
vertising purposes.102
Hence, all the cases discussed in the preceding section dealt with
whether the defendant had capitalized on the persona of the plaintiff for ad-
vertising purposes."o3 Of necessity, any other mention of a celebrity's name
would be a question of interest to the public by definition."0 Cases involving
private persons do not carry with them the automatic cachet of public inter-
est, and thus fall into three categories: those which relate to matters of public
concern, those which do not relate to matters of public concern but where the
plaintiff has consented to the use by the defendant, and those which do not
relate to matters of public concern and where the defendant has failed to se-
cure the plaintiff s consent.os
A significant difference between defamation cases and cases brought
under section 540.08 occurs when dealing with private persons embroiled in
matters of public interest.' Only where a defendant is at fault for publish-
102. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a) (2011).
103. See supra Part 1.
104. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003). It is also
possible that the picture of a celebrity can be sold specifically for its commercial value, rather
than used for advertising purposes. Id. at 918, 938. In a case involving Tiger Woods, an artist
painted a portrait of Woods after his first victory at the Masters Golf Tournament. Id. at 918.
The artist then sought to market prints of the portrait, and the company to which Woods had
licensed his right of publicity sued. Id. at 918-19. The artist won, but only because the por-
trait carried sufficient "transformative value" to qualify as a permissive use. Id. at 938 (apply-
ing Ohio law). The "transformative value" test has not always protected defendants, however.
See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
105. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 385-86 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); see, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 929-31.
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Quintero, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619, 636 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Perhaps worthy of noting, Florida courts have not squarely confronted the question of what
matters might be considered of "public interest." See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 423 So.
2d at 384 (citing Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972), quashed by 305 So.
2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)). Of substantial guidance in this regard is a
five-prong test put forward by a California appellate court in a defamation case:
First, "public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity. Second, a matter of public interest
should be something of concern to a substantial number of people. Thus, a matter of concern
to the speaker and a relatively small, specific audience is not a matter of public interest. Third,
there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest; the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. Fourth,
the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort "to
gather ammunition for another round of [private] controversy ..... Finally, those charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the clai-
mant a public figure.
Thomas, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 634-35 (citations omitted).
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ing defamatory material relating to a private person' may the defamed
plaintiff recover damages. 08 In contrast, a plaintiff claiming a violation of
section 540.08 need only prove the use of name or likeness for public "use
for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose . . ..
The defendant would bear the burden of raising and proving any statutory
defenses." 0 For example, the statute provides a defense to the publisher
when the use is "part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a
current and legitimate public interest and where such name or likeness is not
used for advertising purposes.""' Hence, the question of what constitutes a
commercial or advertising purpose becomes crucial where the plaintiff is a
private person." 2
The leading Supreme Court of Florida case involving a private person
and a matter of public interest involved the relatives of Billy Tyne, who was
presumed to have died aboard a ship named the Andrea Gail in a storm in
1991.113 The magnitude of the storm received extensive media coverage and
in 1997, a book entitled The Perfect Storm appeared chronicling the author's
version of what might have happened to Tyne and the rest of the crew."14
Three years later, the Warner Brothers movie, The Perfect Storm, was re-
leased.' "Unlike the book, the Picture presented a concededly dramatized
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). "[S]o long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individu-
al." Id. at 347.
108. Id. at 338-39. Florida has adopted a negligence standard as the test for a defendant's
liability in defamation cases involving private individuals: "The prevailing First Amendment
and Florida law . .. is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority in the country on
this subject which has followed a . . . standard of negligence in defamation actions where the
plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public figure." Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 423 So. 2d
at 385.
109. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2011).
110. See id. § 540.08(4)(a)-(c).
111. Id. § 540.08(4)(a).
112. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334. One might also note that in section 540.08 cases, plain-
tiffs do not claim the use of name or image did not portray them falsely; in defamation cases,
however, an essential element of the plaintiffs case is the falsity of the publication. See Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986). "Here, we hold that, at least where
a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false." Id.
113. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 2005).
114. See SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE
SEA (W.W. Norton & Co., 1997).
115. THE PERFECT STORM (Warner Bros. 2000), available at http://perfectstorm.warner
bros.com/cmp/flash-thefilm-fr.html.
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account of both the storm and the crew of the Andrea Gail."I16 The movie
contained the actual names of the crew, and consequently, Tyne's surviving
children, along with family members of the remaining crew, sued Warner
Brothers for violation of section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes."7 The suit
began in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
and the plaintiffs appealed that court's granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment." 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Supreme Court of Florida."'
The question as rephrased read: "Does the phrase 'for purposes of trade or
for any commercial or advertising purpose' in section 540.08(1), Florida
Statutes, include publications which do not directly promote a product or
service?" 20 After discussing earlier cases from the lower Florida courts, the
Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative. 2'
The court first reviewed the First District Court of Appeal decision in
Loft v. Fuller.12 2 Loft involved a suit brought under section 540.08 by the
survivors of a man who perished in a plane crash-a crash that formed the
basis of a later book and motion picture, both of which used the name of the
decedent. 23 1In upholding an order dismissing the complaint, the court rea-
soned so cogently that the Supreme Court of Florida approved of its opinion
from which it quoted extensively:
In our view, section 540.08, by prohibiting the use of one's name
or likeness for trade, commercial or advertising purposes, is de-
signed to prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly pro-
mote the product or service of the publisher. Thus, the publication
is harmful not simply because it is included in a publication that is
sold for profit, but rather because of the way it associates the indi-
vidual's name or his personality with something else . . . . We
simply do not believe that the term "commercial," as employed by
[sjection 540.08, was meant to be construed to bar the use of
people's names in [media discussions of public interest].124
Significantly, the Loft court based its conclusion on whether the name
of the plaintiff was directly used to promote the sale of a product, and the
116. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 804.
117. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011).
118. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 804-05.
119. Id. at 803.
120. Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted).
121. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 810.
122. 408 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806.
123. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806.
124. Id. at 806 (second and third emphasis added) (quoting Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23).
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Supreme Court of Florida agreed. 25 Unlike cases involving celebrities, the
use of Loft's name would not make it any more probable that potential view-
ers would rush to see the movie-the interest of the public lay in the plane
crash and its aftermath, not the identity of the individual decedent.126
The court next discussed Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc.,127 in which Patty Va-
lentine's name appeared in Bob Dylan's song about the arrest and conviction
of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter.128 "[Patty] Valentine testified as a witness at
the highly publicized 1967 trial of prizefighter Rubin 'Hurricane' Carter and
John Artis."l 29 She sued the producer of the record on which the song ap-
peared for violating the Florida statute.130 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment for C.B.S., holding that the Carter trial continued to be of
public interest and that "an interpretation that the statute absolutely bars the
use of an individual's name without consent for any purpose would raise
grave questions as to constitutionality."l31
Finally, the court addressed Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC,132 in which a
young woman in Panama City consented to receive a strand of beads in time-
honored Mardi Gras fashion-by exposing her breasts,133 this time to the lens
of a video camera.' The producers of Girls Gone Wild then used segments
of Lane in their video and advertised it on paid television by showing brief,
censored clips of Lane and others.' Lane sued for violation of section
125. Id.; Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622-23.
126. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011); Loft, 408 So. 2d at 621.
127. 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
128. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 806-07; Valentine, 698 F.2d at 431. "Pistol shots ring out in the
barroom night. Enter Patty Valentine from the upper hall. She sees the bartender in a pool of
blood. Cries out, 'My God, they killed them all!' Valentine, 698 F.2d at 432 n.1.
129. Id. at 431.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 433.
132. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
133. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 807; see generally Mardi Gras History & Traditions, MARDI
GRAS NEW ORLEANS, http://www.mardigrasneworleans.com/quartermardi.html#breasts (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011).
134. Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 807; Lone, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. In point of fact, Lane's
companion having received beads in the same manner during Mardi Gras in New Orleans two
years previously, recited the encounter to Lane, adding that her photograph from the New
Orleans venture later appeared in a men's magazine. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
135. Id. at 1210. "Girls Gone Wild, [is] a video that depicts a variety of young women
exposing their buttocks and genitals in public places." Id. Lane argued that she had con-
sented to the videotaping, but not to its use in Girls Gone Wild. Id. The trial court found her
argument unpersuasive. Id. at 1220.
[Tihe interactions between Lane and the cameraman were not private in nature. Lane exposed
herself on a public street while several pedestrians were in the general vicinity. . .. Lane did
not know the cameraman before whom she exposed herself. It is unreasonable to expect that a
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540.08, but the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, stating:
In this case, it is irrefutable that the Girls Gone Wild video is
an expressive work created solely for entertainment purposes. Si-
milarly, it is also irrefutable that while Lane's image and likeness
were used to sell copies of Girls Gone Wild, her image and like-
ness were never associated with a product or service unrelated to
that work. Indeed, in both the video and its commercial adver-
tisements, Lane is never shown endorsing or promoting a product,
but rather, as part of an expressive work in which she voluntarily
participated.136
The point in Lane not directly addressed by the Supreme Court of Flori-
da in Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,137 is that an advertisement for
a work protected under the First Amendment has the same protection as the
work itself.'3 8  Thus, the advertisements for the Girls Gone Wild movie,
which depicted Lane, could not form the basis of an independent cause of
action.13 9 Tyne does, however, address the issue in relation to a different case
involving a movie representing the history of the Black Panther Party."'0 The
court in that case held:
Moreover, use of a person's name and likeness to advertise a
novel, play, or motion picture concerning that individual is not ac-
total stranger would limit the viewing of a video with shots of young women publicly exposing
themselves to only those persons present at the time of the filming.
Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
136. Id. at 1213. The trial court's conclusion that the video irrefutably constituted an
expressive work invited the scorn of a later judge:
Lane is an anomalous case which holds that "it is irrefutable that the Girls Gone Wild video is
an expressive work created solely for entertainment purposes." This Court cannot similarly
hold that the images in question are expressive works, as they do not contain any creative
components or transformative elements.
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1213). See also the implicit scathing criticism of the result in
Lane by the recent Eleventh Circuit case, Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1317-19 (11th
Cir. 2011) (holding that minors in suits against the producers of Girls Gone Wild movies
should be permitted to proceed anonymously).
137. 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005).
138. See Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-13; see also Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61
F.3d 1045, 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding no violation of publicity right by the publisher
of a book on the assassination of John F. Kennedy, which advertised the book by comparing it
to theories of other authors and displaying their pictures).
139. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.




tionable as an infringement of the right of publicity. For example,
the use of another's name and likeness in the title of a movie does
not infringe on the right of publicity since such use "is clearly re-
lated to the content of the movie and is not a disguised advertise-
ment for the sale of goods or services or a collateral commercial
product."141
Thus, the advertisements in Lane did not violate the Florida statute. 142
Before moving on, it is well to note a problem with the Tyne opinion.
Surprisingly, the court misinterprets the California case involving the T-
shirts with the sketch of the Three Stooges.143 The Tyne court erroneously
stated: "[T]he California Supreme Court held that an artist who sold litho-
graphs and T-shirts bearing the image of the Three Stooges did not violate
the plaintiffs' right of publicity because the case did not concern commercial
speech."'" Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court of California created "a
balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to
be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imita-
tion." 45 In accordance with this test, the court then held:
Turning to Saderup's work, we can discern no significant
transformative or creative contribution. His undeniable skill is
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, con-
ventional depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their
fame. Indeed, were we to decide that Saderup's depictions were
protected by the First Amendment, we cannot perceive how the
right of publicity would remain a viable right other than in cases of
falsified celebrity endorsements.
Moreover, the marketability and economic value of Saderup's
work derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.
While that fact alone does not necessarily mean the work receives
no First Amendment protection, we can perceive no transformative
elements in Saderup's works that would require such protection.146
141. Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 336 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
142. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
143. See Tyne, 901 So. 2d at 809.
144. Id.
145. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
146. Id. at 811.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court of California upheld a judgment for
damages, attorney's fees, and costs based on stipulated facts presented at
trial.147
Although Florida courts have not passed directly on the matter, as noted
earlier, occasionally the image of a celebrity is marketed for its very com-
mercial value.148 Although truly unusual, the same can be true of the image
of a private person.149 Should such a case arise, it is likely the court will
have to retreat from its present position that: "the term 'commercial pur-
pose' as used in section 540.08(1) does not apply to publications, including
motion pictures, which do not directly promote a product or service."' 50 Ra-
ther, the court will in all probability, have to expand its holding to encompass
cases of the direct sale of an image of an individual. That said, as Tyne also
demonstrates, once people become embroiled in a matter of public concern,
the "newsworthiness" provision of section 540.08(4) will continue to bar
them from asserting a cause of action based on the right of publicity.''
147. Id. at 801, 811.
148. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
149. Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1958). The sale
of a high-quality print of the very famous Eisenstadt photograph of the "kissing sailor" as a
collector's item was held to create a jury issue on violation of the publicity rights of the sailor
in the photograph under Rhode Island law. Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968,
973 (D.R.I. 1988). The Second Circuit reversed the grant of a defense motion for summary
judgment in a case alleging that a publication entitled Wrestling All-Stars Poster Magazine
violated the publicity rights of the wrestlers. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870
F.2d 85, 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1989). The publication contained no textual material, and only post-
ers bearing the pictures of the wrestlers stapled together inside the cover A Ia Playboy play-
mate pin-ups. See id. at 86. In each case, the court held the claim of First Amendment protec-
tion would not withstand the blatant use for trade purposes under statutes similar to Florida's.
Id. at 87, 89; Mendonsa, 678 F. Supp. at 971.
150. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 810 (Fla. 2005).
151. Id. at 808; see Ewing v. A-I Mgmt., Inc., 481 So. 2d 99, 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (per curiam) (holding that the use of a name on a wanted poster is newsworthy); see,
e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding a "where are
they now" article regarding a former child prodigy is in the continuing public interest). On the
other hand, in construing its own statute, the New York Court of Appeals held that a young
girl's picture used to illustrate an article on teenage sex fell within the newsworthiness excep-
tion even though the girl had engaged in none of the activity claimed in the article: "Notably,
if the newsworthiness exception is forfeited solely because the juxtaposition of a plaintiffs
photograph to a newsworthy article creates a false impression about the plaintiff, liability
under [the statute] becomes indistinguishable from the common-law tort of false light invasion
of privacy." Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 727 N.E.2d
549, 550, 556 (N.Y.) (per curiam), vacated, 208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000). The common law
tort of privacy was not recognized in New York's jurisprudence. Id. at 551. However, Judge
Bellacosa wrote a scathing dissent:
In sum, the practical and theoretical consequence of the negative answer justifies a too-
facile escape valve from the operation of the statute, one that is also unilaterally within the
1332011]
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IV. "PRIVATE PERSONS" IN PRIVATE MATTERS
Where the picture or name of a private person is used outside of a mat-
ter involving the public interest, the cases involving section 540.08 do not
differ in theory from defamation cases.152 The delicate balance between the
First Amendment and private rights now tips more in favor of the plaintiff.153
Typical of these cases is Baucom v. Haverty,15 4 in which Ms. Baucom had
retained attorneys to represent her after a fall at a restaurant.'55 The company
that prepared a medical report for her attorneys later used that report when
promoting itself to other law firms."' The report not only contained her pic-
ture, but confidential psychiatric information relating to her.157  The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations, but the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, hold-
ing that "a new cause of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began
to run anew, the first time the report was read or shown to someone at each
new potential employer."' 8  While Baucom deals more with a procedural
matter than the substance of the statute, 159 the facts parallel those in Ameri-
can Ventures, Inc. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc.W In this in-
stance, the identity of the plaintiff did not serve as an inducement for law
control of the alleged wrongdoer.. . . When an aggrieved person like Messenger reaches for
the statutory lifeline, the newsworthiness notion dissipates it into a dry mirage. That is not fair
or right.
Id. at 562-63 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
152. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 778 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). "[D]efamation law does not differ from state efforts to control ob-
scenity, ensure loyalty, protect consumers, oversee professions, or pursue other public welfare
goals through content-based regulation of speech." Id. (citations omitted).
153. See, e.g., Baucom v. Haverty, 805 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory
statements involve no issue of public concern. To make this determination, we must employ
the approach approved in Gertz and balance the State's interest in compensating private indi-
viduals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this
type of expression.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757. As noted earlier, Florida has steadfastly maintained
the strong state interest in protecting privacy rights. See Mar. 7, 2007 Staff Analysis, supra
note 72, at 2.
154. 805 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
155. Id. at 960.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 960-61.
159. See Baucom, 805 So. 2d at 960-61.
160. No. C92-1817Z, 1993 WL 468643, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 1993); see supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
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firms to hire the defendant.' 6 ' Baucom thus demonstrates that the mere tan-
gential use of a person's name or picture in connection with advertising may
serve to violate the statute.162
Yet another case found the producer of a Girls Gone Wild video defend-
ing a lawsuit when he placed a picture of a young woman at Mardi Gras on
the cover of and in the advertisements for one of his videotapes. 63 The court
had little trouble denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint:
"Plaintiff has squarely alleged that defendant published her photograph in
Florida for commercial and advertising purposes-specifically on the pack-
age of defendant's videotape and in advertisements therefor[e]-and that
defendant did so without her permission. This states a claim under [section]
540.08."'64
Although beyond this article's scope, it is noteworthy that the court also
upheld a cause of action under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practic-
es Act (DUTPA).1 65 Thus, plaintiffs suing under section 540.08 may also be
able to raise claims under DUTPA as well as the Federal Lanham Act.166 For
instance, in Florida, the Lanham Act formed a count of the complaint in Bo-
sem v. Musa Holdings, Inc.,67 in which an eye doctor successfully moved for
161. See Baucom, 805 So. 2d at 960.
162. See id. at 960-61.
163. Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, L.L.C., No. 4:01CV495-RH, 2002 WL 32107540, at *1
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2002). The operating procedure of the producer of the Girls Gone Wild
videos is described in the Eleventh Circuit's factually accurate yet thinly-veiled contemptuous
critique:
Joseph Francis is the creator and effective controlling officer of companies-including the
three other named defendants in this case-that maintain the "Girls Gone Wild" franchise.
Francis has made millions of dollars by going to places crowded with young, enthusiastic, and
often-intoxicated women and filming them exposing their breasts, fondling each other, kissing
each other, and sometimes engaging in more explicit sexual acts. Francis and his agents typi-
cally have the filmed women sign a release form affirming that they are over the age of eigh-
teen and that the Girls Gone Wild franchise can use the footage. He and his companies then
edit the films to create short scenes of women in various stages of undress and engaged in dif-
ferent types of sexual activities. Francis and his companies bunch the scenes together on por-
nographic DVDs that they sell online and through advertisements on television.
Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Pitts v. Francis, No.
5:07cvl69-RS-EMT, 2007 WL 4482168, at *1, *3, *26 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007) (denying
motion that judge recuse himself and discussing the modus operandi of the Girls Gone Wild
producer).
164. Gritzke, 2002 WL 32107540, at *1.
165. See id. at *1, *4; FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2011).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 501.201; see, e.g., Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc.,
610 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (video club using Woody Allen look-alike in its
advertising); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (Sam-
sung using a robot dressed like Vanna White in a commercial for a videocassette recorder).
167. 46 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
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partial summary judgment finding the defendant liable for using his name
and likeness in its advertising. 168
What may well have proved the most blatant violation of the statute oc-
curred in Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc.,'69 where a young pho-
tographer posted a photograph of herself on a website "which [was] an on-
line artistic community where photographers receive[d] feedback about, and
s[old], their photographs."" 0 The photograph, still present on-line, shows the
photographer fully dressed in a vest, long skirt and top hat, with her left
shoulder bare."' The defendant--or someone associated with the defen-
dant-lifted the picture from the website and, without permission, used the
picture on the cover of a pornographic film.'72 The photographer sued for
violation of the statute, 173 and received a default judgment in which the court
found: "The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiffs self-portrait was
placed, without her permission, prominently on the packaging of the Body
Magic DVD for the purpose of marketing a pornographic movie with which
she had no association. These facts constitute a violation of this statute."1 74
She recovered almost $130,000 in damages, including compensatory damag-
es of $100,000 on the defamation claim. 75
Coton should serve as the harbinger of a new breed of cases-those
which arise during the computer age.' 71 Social networking sites mean photo-
graphs, names, and personal information are available to virtually anyone-
or anyone virtual, for that matter.177 We can expect the statute to be tested
far more frequently where unscrupulous individuals simply take private per-
sonae from the internet and use them for commercial gain.
168. Id. at 43, 46 (affirming the trial court's grant of motion for summary judgment and
reinstating the award of prejudgment interest).
169. 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
170. Id. at 1303.
171. No Easy Way Out, DEVIANTART, available at http://larafairie.deviantart.com/gallery
/?q=no+easy+way+out (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
172. Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1303; Teen Sues Over XXX-Video "Debut", THE SMOKING
GUN, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/teen-sues-over-xxx-video-debut (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011).
173. Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. She also put forward claims for "copyright in-
fringement . .. defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1302.
174. Id. at 1310.
175. Id. at 1314, 1316. Although beyond the scope of this article, the court engaged in a
meticulous discussion of the damages it awarded for each count of the complaint. Id. at 1311-
16.
176. See Coton, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
177. See, e.g., SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET:
SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (2010).
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An unusual case spawned by the Internet was Almeida v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,"' where the Internet retailer Amazon offered for sale a book entitled
Anjos Proibidos.17 9 A picture of the book's cover appeared together with a
description of the book and its price, and the cover featured a picture of Al-
meida. 80 When she was a minor, Almeida's mother signed a release form
permitting the use of Almeida's photograph in a gallery exhibition and in a
book of photographs based on the exhibition."' Nine years later, a second
edition of the book appeared, but this time Almeida's photograph was repro-
duced on the cover of the book, which Amazon then offered for sale.'82 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Almeida's statutory cause of ac-
tion against Amazon. 183
The instant section 540.08 action is brought against Amazon,
an internet bookseller that provides services similar to a traditional
bookseller. Amazon provides its online customers with a searcha-
ble book database with links to product detail pages for each book
in its database. Each product detail page provides the book's cover
image, the publisher's description of the book, and in many in-
stances editorial and customer content. From the product detail
page, customers may link to an order placement page, where they
may complete their purchase and specify the shipping method. In
this manner, Amazon's role as an internet bookseller closely paral-
lels that of a traditional bookseller. Because internet customers are
unable to browse through shelves of books and observe the actual
book cover photos and publisher content, Amazon replicates the
bookstore experience by providing its customers with online cover
images and publisher book descriptions.1
The court rejected Almeida's suit, for it recognized that the Internet re-
quired the rethinking of traditional rules.'18  While Amazon unquestionably
sought to sell the book, the display was not of Almeida but instead of the
book itself."8
178. 456 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 2006).
179. Id. at 1319.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1318-19.
182. Id. at 1319.
183. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1328.
184. Id. at 1325.
185. See id. at 1326.
186. See id. at 1325.
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Amazon's use of book cover images is not an endorsement or pro-
motion of any product or service, but is merely incidental to, and
customary for, the business of internet book sales.
Under the allegations of Almeida's complaint, we discern no
set of facts by which an internet retailer such as Amazon, which
functions as the internet equivalent to a traditional bookseller,
would be liable for displaying content that is incidental to book
sales, such as providing customers with access to a book's cover
image and a publisher's description of the book's content. Accor-
dingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as
to Amazon's right of publicity claim, but we do so on the ground
that Amazon did not use Almeida's image for the purpose of di-
rectly promoting a product or service in violation of section
540.08. 187
Almeida thus represents an Internet version of Tyne: where the underly-
ing product is protected, advertisements for sale of the product will share the
protection.' 88 We can expect courts to modify law established under tradi-
tional rules of commerce for the internet era.
V. DEFENSES UNDER THE STATUTE OTHER THAN PUBLIC INTEREST
Subsection four of the statute provides for three instances in which the
statute will not apply: a) legitimate public interest or newsworthiness; b)
consent; and c) incidental use of members of the public.' The first of these
was discussed earlier, where newsworthiness would trump privacy concerns,
but not if the defendant used the persona for advertising purposes. 90 As to
consent, established case law regarding consent applies to the statute as
well.'9 For example, when restaurants intercepted private satellite broad-
casts of Miami Dolphins football games, the court dismissed the team's
claims under the statute.' 92 "Even if a prohibited use had occurred, the play-
187. Id. at 1326 (citation omitted).
188. See Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324-25; see also Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901
So. 2d 802, 808-09 (Fla. 2005).
189. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(4)(a)-(c) (2011).
190. Id. § 540.08(4)(a).
191. See Nat'l Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
192. Id.
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ers' contractual consent to appear in game telecasts constituted waiver of
their rights under the Florida statute." 93
The incidental use provision came into play where a plaintiff in a copy-
right action used a picture of the defendant in a marketing brochure.194 The
plaintiff had neither used the name of the defendant, nor displayed the pic-
ture with such definition that he could readily be recognized from among the
three men portrayed.'9 5 When the defendant filed a cross-claim under the
statute, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing:
Moreover, this photograph falls within the statutory "member
of the public" exception. The three men in the photograph are not
named, are not in uniform, and are not otherwise connected with
the use of the photograph. Defendant Souliere appearing in the
photograph is merely fortuitous. Therefore, this Court finds that
no reasonable juror could find that the photograph of defendant
Souliere in plaintiffs brochure constituted commercial exploitation
or that it does not fall within the member of the public excep-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on cases which have interpreted section 540.08 of the Florida
Statutes, plaintiffs who live in the public eye cannot expect to recover under
the statute for the use of their name or likeness unless the defendant has
usurped their personae to promote a product or service. Similarly, private
plaintiffs will lose their suits when the defendant has used them in connec-
tion with the public interest, when they have consented to the use, or when
they happen to be just another "face in the crowd." However, when the de-
fendant uses the plaintiffs name or likeness for promotional purposes, the
plaintiff will be able to recover.
Two areas seem ripe for further development. First, we can expect the
courts to continue to modify existing law to suit new problems raised by in-
ternet, e-marketing, and social networking. Second, it will be interesting to
see how firmly the courts are wedded to the promotional language of Tyne
193. Id. The court also found the defendants protected under the statute as the matter was
of legitimate public interest. Id. However, the court did find that the defendants had violated
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 10-11.
194. Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1014-15 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
195. Id. at 1016.
196. Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
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when confronted with a case involving the actual sale of a person's portrait
or likeness.
